## APPEAL NO. 041191 FILED JULY 19, 2004

This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers' Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 *et seq.* (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on April 28, 2004. The hearing officer determined that respondent 1 (claimant's) \_\_\_\_\_\_, compensable injury extends to include the diagnosed L5-S1 disc herniation. The appellant (self-insured) files a request for review in which it argues that the decision of the hearing officer was not supported by the evidence. The claimant responds, urging affirmance. There is no response from respondent 2 (subclaimant) to the self-insured's request for review in the appeal file.

## **DECISION**

Finding sufficient evidence to support the decision of the hearing officer and no reversible error in the record, we affirm the decision and order of the hearing officer.

Extent of injury is a question of fact. Texas Workers' Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93613, decided August 24, 1993. Section 410.165(a) provides that the hearing officer, as finder of fact, is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence as well as of the weight and credibility that is to be given to the evidence. It was for the hearing officer, as trier of fact, to resolve the inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). This is equally true regarding medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos. 666 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). An appeals-level body is not a fact finder and does not normally pass upon the credibility of witnesses or substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if the evidence would support a different result. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied). When reviewing a hearing officer's decision for factual sufficiency of the evidence we should reverse such decision only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); Pool v. Ford Motor Company, 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986). The self-insured essentially makes the same factual arguments on appeal that it made at the hearing. Applying the standard of review outlined above, we find no reversible error.

The decision and order of the hearing officer are affirmed.

The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is (a self-insured governmental entity) and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is

SUPERINTENDENT (ADDRESS) (CITY), TEXAS (ZIP CODE).

|                    | Gary L. Kilgore |
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|                    | Appeals Judge   |
| CONCUR:            |                 |
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|                    |                 |
| Chris Cowan        |                 |
| Appeals Judge      |                 |
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| Margaret L. Turner |                 |
| Appeals Judge      |                 |